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The Role of Host Cities in the Cyclic Process of
Environmental Regulation of Sports Mega-Events
Rebecca Schmidt1
Abstract
The chapter uses a case study of the environmental protection and sustainability framework for
Olympic Games to examine the interactive role of local government actors as innovators in the creation
of transnational regulation. The host city level has been at the forefront of innovating this framework.
Developments initiated at this level were later taken up by the International Olympic Committee (IOC)
and became mandatory for future host cities, in a dynamic the chapter terms ‘cyclical regulation’. The
chapter makes two main claims about this process: First, in certain conditions, host cities and their local
organizers can ratchet up social and environmental standards for sports mega-events by going beyond
the existing regulatory framework in their hosting bids and thereby initiating an upward revision of the
framework; and second, the local level provides a platform from which various other actors can be coopted into the preparation of sports mega-events and thereby influence transnational regulation.
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1. Introduction
Transnational regulation is a ‘dynamic, co-regulatory and co-evolutionary process’ that involves a
variety of actors and institutions (Wood et al. 2015: 340). The transnational business governance
interactions (TBGI) project acknowledges this and rather than relying on one narrative of how
transnational governance and governance interactions come about, it provides a framework, setting out
features that any theory of transnational business governance interactions should take into account (ibid).
The role of transnational actors, whether international organizations, civil society or business entities, in
developing and putting forward transnational regulation has been analysed in many different contexts
(e.g. Slaughter 2004; Büthe & Mattli, 2011; Abbott et al. 2015). Less pronounced in these and many other
studies is the role local government entities play in transnational multi-stakeholder regulation. This
chapter argues that such entities can innovate transnational regulatory processes and can also provide an
entrance point for other actors, such as local communities, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and
other actors promoting the provision of public goods, to develop and influence transnational regulation.
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To this end, the chapter presents a case study of the environmental protection and sustainability
framework implemented within the context of the Olympic Games. Since the 1990s the Olympic
movement has implemented increasingly extensive environmental regulations. From the start the local,
host city level played a crucial role in the development and expansion of this regulatory regime. Two host
cities, Lillehammer and London, stand out for their innovative approaches to environmental and
sustainability regulation in the preparation and execution of their respective Games. By providing the role
model of the first green games, Lillehammer set a standard that was translated into the initial
environmental framework at the IOC level. Later innovations, such as London’s sustainability management
system, were also integrated into the movement’s regulatory structure and became binding for
subsequent Games. The chapter terms the dynamic at work in this case study ‘cyclical regulation’. In this
context, as in many other transnational regulatory settings (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000, p. 10), local
governments function as both rule takers and rule innovators, they are both regulators and regulated.
Although the chapter examines a single case study, it has broader relevance for several reasons.
In recent years, local government entities have become increasingly important actors in a transnational
regulatory context. Often the local level is more open for regulatory innovations, providing a sphere where
innovations can be tested before they are promoted on a larger scale.1 It is also a place where local and
transnational business and civil society actors find an entrance point to promote their respective
regulatory agendas, leading to complex regulatory interactions and structures.2 This open and
experimental character is revealed particularly in recent trends to apply and integrate new technologies
as governance tools (summarized under the smart city concept, a range of new technologies are applied
to respond regulatory and infrastructural challenges in city governance3). Such developments lead to
enhanced local level engagement in transnational regulatory processes, which warrants further research.
The Chapter adopts the following structure: the theoretical framework and empirical approach
are presented in Part 2; Part 3 contains the case study, followed by a discussion of the findings in Part 4
and a short conclusion.

2. Theoretical Framework and Empirical Approach
Global regulation occurs in highly interrelated ways, through fluid interactions of multiplicities of
actors, institutions, and sources over time and across scales. Literature addressing the complexity of
business governance interactions is vast (eg. Büthe 2010; Grabosky 2013; Eberlein et al. 2014; Wood
2015). Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal have used the governance triangle to examine the interactions
between different types of actors (state, NGOs and firms) (Abbott & Snidal 2009). Scholars of new
regulation and governance portrayed the multifaceted interactions of public and private organizations,
instruments, and norms (Black 2001; Braithwaite & Drahos 2000; Eberlein et al. 2014). Focusing on the
role of local level actors as transnational regulatory innovators and on the process through which these
innovations are taken up by transnational regulators and disseminated into different contexts, this
chapter links to the TBGI framework in two ways. First, on a technical level it depicts contexts within which
local-transnational interactions take place. For the area of sport regulation, it unearths the key
mechanisms and pathways of such interactions. Secondly, regarding the normative ambition of this
volume for better regulatory performance, increased social and environmental standards and the
empowerment of marginalized actors, the chapter points to different entrance points within a cyclical
regulatory process that weaker actors and advocates for higher standards can deploy in pursuing their
goals.
Beyond its linkage with the TBGI framework, further preliminary remarks are necessary: The first
concerns the term ‘regulatory innovation’, which is used throughout this chapter. Based on Black, Lodge,
and Thatcher’s definition, it should be understood as normatively neutral, referring to ‘changes in the
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performance of regulatory functions, institutional structures and organizational processes which have an
impact on the regulatory regime’ (Black, Lodge & Thatcher 2005). If in the present examples local actors
function as regulatory innovators, they initiate such changes transnationally through experimentation and
the dissemination of local experiences and practices.
This leads to the second set of remarks, regarding the overlaps and similarities of this chapter
with other strands of literature. One notable related body of scholarship discusses experimentalist
governance (Dorf & Zeitlin 1998; Sabel & Zeitlin 2010; Sabel & Zeitlin 2008). Experimentalist governance
describes processes, particularly found within EU governance, whereby a superordinate regulator sets
framework goals together with lower level entities (e.g. member states). Those goals are then
implemented by the lower level authorities who have considerable freedom regarding the ways in which
implementation occurs. In a third step, implementation strategies are reported to the higher level, and
their performance is measured and evaluated in a comparative way. Based on this evaluation, framework
goals and metrics are regularly revised (Sabel & Zeitlin 2010, 3; Sabel & Zeitlin 2008, 271; see also Dorf &
Zeitlin 1998). Relatable processes can also be found in the case at hand, where each new Olympics provide
an experimental playfield for the host city in implementing and furthering the environmental regulatory
framework of the Olympic Movement. Successful regulatory innovations are taken up by the IOC and
consecutively integrated into its general framework. Future host cities must implement those, and by
implementing them, they test their viability in different settings and over time.
Literature on regulatory intermediaries also provides a comparative approach to understand the
general complexity of environments, where ‘regulation often operates indirectly via chains of
intermediation’ (Abbott, Levi-Faur & Snidal 2017b, 5) and takes place across different scales (ibid. 5).
Concretely, regulatory intermediaries come into play where a direct relationship between regulator and
rule target (R and T) is either inefficient or impossible. In such contexts intermediaries step in or are
engaged to provide assistance and resources to accomplish the regulatory goal, constituting a regulatorintermediary-target (RIT) model (Abbott, Levi-Faur & Snidal 2017a, 3). This can be done through the
provision of expertise to facilitate ‘implementation, monitoring behaviour of regulatory targets and
building assurance and trust’ (ibid. 3-4). Often intermediaries are orchestrated by the regulator, who uses
‘soft techniques’ to ‘engage them and their capacities into the regulatory process’ (Abbott, Levi-Faur &
Snidal 2017 a; Abbott et al. 2015). In the case at hand, there are clear direct relationships between host
cities and the Olympic Movement (R and T). However, especially regarding environmental protection and
sustainability we also find the inclusion of third parties into the regulatory processes. Thus, as will be
shown, below NGOs, civil society representatives, and international organizations are active in further
developing the environmental framework and in monitoring compliance by host cities with existing
standards.
The concept of cyclical regulation that I develop in this chapter diverges from these approaches.
The nuances will be developed in more detail throughout the chapter. Preliminary, one can distinguish
three main differences. First, unlike experimentalist governance, cyclical regulation does not take place
within a more or less clearly determined and legally enforceable hierarchy (e.g. the EU). In the Olympic
example, host cities volunteer, or more precisely compete, to host the Games, and regulatory innovation
is one aspect of this competition. The transnational regulator sometimes adopts their ideas and
procedures and implements rules accordingly. In other cases, the context is even more anarchic.
Innovations are adopted without any formal process, only because the proffering entity is regarded to
convey sufficient expertise and experience. Thus, there is at least initially no formalized relationship that
determines responsibilities for innovation.
Secondly, there is no clear allocation of roles between regulators, intermediaries and targets as
in the RIT framework: local level actors are not really intermediaries, as they have minimal ties with and
no authority over future host cities. One can say that the transnational regulator exercises some
orchestration activity, since it encourages local regulatory innovation through its competitive selection
TBGI Project Working Paper No. 24
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process. Yet local entities act either independently or within an authority relationship with the
transnational regulator in which they are rule takers as well as rule innovators. To change the behaviour
of future host cities, however, the IOC must implement the innovation in its regulatory framework and in
future host city contracts. Here one can find overlap with the experimentalist framework, in that the
boundaries between rule makers and rule takers are blurred (Dorf & Zeitlin 1998:354).
Finally, the cyclical regulatory innovation process I describe is usually not linked to one particular
regulatory regime. Because innovations are taken up at different regulatory levels and by different
regulatory systems (municipality, transnational sports regulator, the events management sector, etc.)
they involve and spread across a large variety of regimes, which often have no direct relationship to the
original sector (sports in the case at hand).
Beyond these differences, this chapter, while situated in these strands of literature, particularly
emphasizes the importance of local level entities (especially cities) for the global economy and as a
consequence for business regulation. This role has been pointed out for some time (Hall 1966, Friedmann
& Wolff 1982; Sassen 2001 and most recently Herrschel & Newman 2017). From the 1960s onwards and
since the end of the Cold War, cities have become central ‘control sites in the international economic
order’ (Sassen 2001:5). This development not only impacts the dynamics within the city (e.g. increased
socio-economic inequality), it also alters the relationship between the city and the state in which it is
located (ibid. 8). Globalization and communication technologies have increased interconnectedness
between cities. Municipalities are no longer responsible only to their residents and to higher-level national
or subnational governments. They have complex relationships with each other and with transnationally
operating actors, relationships that are characterized by cooperation, competition, and other forms of
interactions, such as intermediary functions. Local actors can therefore become creators and facilitators
of global norms (Herrschel & Newman 2017).
In the context of sport, the importance of the local level is not surprising, as it is the point where
the transnational regime interacts with a variety of different entities. The Games are the single most
important deliverable of the Olympic movement, and outside actors have the greatest opportunities to
influence the Olympic regime in the preparation and execution phase of the Games. For a few decades,
local and transnational NGOs and activist groups have either treated the Games as a platform to spread
their message, or have used the local level to impact regulation in the sports regime as a whole (Hayes &
Karamichas 2012; Dansero 2012; Whitson 2012; Renou 2012).

3. Host Cities and Sustainability Regulation in the Sport Context
a) The Selection of Host Cities
Events such as the Olympic Games have been labelled mega events. The term is used to describe
‘large-scale cultural (including commercial and sporting) events, which have a dramatic character, mass
popular appeal and international significance’ (Roche 2001:1). This significance includes the broad reach
these events have globally and the impact they have at the local level (Roche 2001; Hayes & Karamichas
2012; Horne & Manzenreiter, 2006). The Olympics are broadcast to more than 200 national territories
and reach up to 4.8 billion people. The London Olympics broadcast rights alone created a revenue of 3.9
billion US dollars.4 These mega events have a significant social, economic, and political dimension beyond
the Olympic Movement and the sporting community. Mega-events are also considered to ‘increasingly
provide a platform for economic growth oriented approaches to environmental protection and
amelioration’. In this scenario, the IOC and other sport organizations function ‘as regulatory authority for
the development and dissemination of environmental best practice and sustainable technologies,
facilitating the creation and growth of new markets’ (Hayes & Karamichas 2012:10-11).
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The IOC’s strong position vis-à-vis potential host cities at the selection phase is important for its
role as a regulatory authority. Its power is reduced later in the process, but it can still exert control through
the Coordination Commission, which is closely involved in the preparation from the IOC side. Finally, the
IOC can withdraw the Games from a host city, although this measure of last resort has never been
applied.5 To understand how standards developed by one host city are implemented in the preparations
for subsequent games, one must look at the way host cities are selected. By selecting new host cities
based on experiences from previous preparation and execution phases, lessons learned at one host city
serve as a basis for the next one. Crucial in this context is the bidding phase, where the IOC scrutinizes the
candidature files and suggests improvements necessary to be considered in the selection process. 6
The selection process is not static, rather it changes and expands with almost every new selection
process. Through a recent reform put in place by the IOC’s Agenda 2020, the general structure of the
selection process has changed in an even more substantial way (IOC, 2014). Under the old regime, in effect
before 2015, potential host cities underwent two selection stages: a candidature acceptance and a
candidature phase.7 In the first phase, potential host cities were required to answer a questionnaire
provided by the IOC.8 The information gathered was then assessed with that collected in other categories,
and a decision to proceed to the next phase was made on this basis. Cities that made it to the candidature
phase were then required to submit a detailed candidature file. This file included a section on environment
and metrology. Here the candidate provided information on its environmental approach, e.g.
geographical features, environmental plans, venue construction and development projects (IOC, 2010).
At both stages environmental concerns were part of the criteria by which a host city was chosen. The last
selection process which formally still applied this old system took place in 2014/15 for the host city of the
2022 Olympics. However, both candidates (Beijing and Almaty) had already adjusted their bids to be in
line with the new approach (Host City 2015).
As mentioned this new approach was introduced through the Olympic Agenda 2020 reform
process, implemented in 2015. The new approach introduced several changes in the bidding process. The
first part of the bidding is now called invitation phase. The idea behind the invitation phase is to provide
support to future host cities in putting together their candidature file, by sharing best practices and
encouraging ‘legacy and sustainability […] to ensure the Games act as a catalyst for positive development
of tangible and intangible legacies for the city and the region’.9 During the candidature phase, aspiring
host cities make an official bid. The candidature phase has three stages, which are again characterised by
dialogue between the cities and the IOC. In each stage the cities have to submit parts of their candidature
files. In support, the IOC provides feedback, hosts workshops and at one point has the candidature cities
participate in an Olympic Games observer programme, through which they receive behind the scenes
insight into the details of how to deliver the Games (ibid). After the final part of the candidature file is
submitted, the IOC Evaluation Commission visits each city and provides a report distributed to all IOC
members. During the IOC Session (the annual meeting of the IOCs plenary organ), the new host city is
selected, and the host city contract is signed (ibid).
Once a host city is chosen, all commitments made in the candidature files become binding and
must be implemented by the local organising committee. They form part of the host city contract, which
includes references to the host city contract principles, operational requirements, the games delivery
plan, and the Olympic Charter.10 To fulfil these commitments, local organizing committees must cooperate
with governmental authorities and other stakeholders to implement appropriate policies across the city
and country. Experts from the IOC and other organizations (such as the United Nations Environment
Programme (UNEP) or Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF)) may assist the local committee in the
development and implementation of environmental policies (Sustainability and Legacy Commission
2017). Furthermore, the IOC Coordination Commission monitors the process together with external
actors, such as UNEP, NGOs or the media to ensure ‘maximum fulfilment of commitments and maximum
use of the opportunity to improve environmental conditions and practices’ (ibid.).
TBGI Project Working Paper No. 24
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The following sections outline how IOC environmental regulation was implemented and expanded
in a cyclical fashion by three innovative host cities.

b) The City as Regulatory Target and Innovator – Three Case Studies
aa) Lillehammer – Early Environmental Standards in the Sport Context
The first step towards a green Olympics was taken in the early 1990s. Increased environmental
awareness in Western societies put the Games’ environmental impact in the spotlight. The Winter
Olympics in Albertville, France in 1992 were viewed by many as an ‘environmental disaster’ and caused
widespread and well-covered protests by environmentalist groups (Cantelon & Letters 2000:299). The
IOC’s lack of an environmental policy was criticized in particular (ibid.). The Lillehammer Games in 1994
provided a response to these complaints and affected the entire Olympic Movement. Unlike previous
Olympic Games, Lillehammer had an environmental policy in place to help execute the Games in a green
and sustainable manner (Olympic Games Legacy 2016). The reason for this was, on the one hand, the long
tradition and experience of environmental protection in Norway, and, on the other, the IOC’s inexperience
in this field, leaving room for local innovation. Long before the Games took place, Norwegians had
developed a ‘strong culture and affiliation to nature’. At the time of the Games there was a ‘powerful
environmental lobby’ and grassroots movement active in the country, which had strong public support
(Myrholt 1996).
This background was reflected in the organization and preparation of the Lillehammer Games.
The preparation and execution of the Games involved a partnership of three actor groups: the private
sector, local authorities and ‘volunteer environmental organizations’ (ibid.:2). The initial environmental
policy was based on a proposal drafted jointly by the Lillehammer Olympic Organizing Committee and
Friends of the Earth Norway. This ‘precipitated a process, starting from grassroots, which set managers,
politicians and environmental volunteers on a steep learning curve and turned the games into a projectbased “environmental showcase”’ (ibid.:3). This success story was eagerly taken up by the IOC. In the
aftermath, the Olympic Charter was amended, and environmental protection was made the third pillar of
Olympism, along with sport and culture. The IOC furthermore set up the Sports and Environment
Commission, now called Sustainability and Legacy Commission, and drafted the Agenda 21 - Sport for
Sustainable Development (ibid.). More recently this Agenda has been complemented by Agenda 2020, a
list of 40 recommendations for the Movement’s future, in which sustainability, broadly conceived, plays
a crucial role (IOC 2014). Apart from using the Lillehammer Games as a role model, the IOC also started a
partnership with UNEP for the development of various policies and programs within the Olympic
movement. Nonetheless, the local experiences from the Lillehammer Games were essential in the
development of the Movement’s environmental policy. Since Lillehammer, environmental concerns and
sustainability have increasingly become a significant issue in both the application and execution phase of
the Games. The environment was a factor already in the selection of the Sydney Games (Myrholt 1996).

bb) London – Sustainability and Event Management
As mentioned, the regulatory framework governing environmental factors of the Olympic
Games developed gradually from one event to the next, yet it is important to mention the special
role of London as s regulatory innovator. Sustainability management, as developed and
implemented by its Organizing Committee, was not a requirement of the IOC at the time of the
bid. In fact, the goal pursued by the London organizers was to hold the first sustainable Olympics,
going beyond the concept of ‘green Games’ and involving also economic and social aspects
(London 2012 Post-Games Sustainability Report 2012:11). The framework for this approach was
provided in the London 2012 Sustainability Policy and Sustainability Plan (Towards a One Planet
TBGI Project Working Paper No. 24
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2012), which was developed by two NGOs – Bioregional and WWF. This framework understands
sustainability in the context of mega event sustainability as having global dimensions beyond the
local context. One element of the London framework that had a broad reach beyond the Games
was the management system approach. The organizing committee’s decision to adopt this
approach led to the creation of the British Standards Institution’s BS 8901 standard and later the
ISO 20121 standard. These standards set specifications for sustainable events management
systems. The London Organizing Committee and the Olympic Delivery Authority were certified to
ISO 20121 The local city administration and the organizing committee did not create ISO 20121,
however. This was left to national and international standard setting processes. Thus, first BSI
developed BS 8901, through a drafting process which was conducted by consultants from Arup
and the Events Industry Association (EIA) using input from the wider events industry sector (BSI,
2007). In the aftermath, BSI together with the Brazilian National Body (ABNT) submitted a joint
proposal for the development of ISO 20121 to ISO and provided for the secretariat of the working
group developing the ISO standard (ISO 2012: 10).
In addition to securing an international standard against which their management system
could be implemented and evaluated, the London organizers desired a framework for reporting
publicly on the sustainability of the Games. To this end, they collaborated with the Global
Reporting Initiative (GRI) and the IOC to develop an Event Organisers Sector Supplement of the
GRI Sustainability Reporting Guidelines (ibid.:12).
The London Organizing Committee considered this comprehensive sustainability
management approach necessary because it was under enormous public scrutiny. This approach
also reflected the political and legal context in which preparation of the London Olympics took
place. Around the time of the bid the newly elected Labour government had started
implementing its ‘better regulation’ agenda, which was intended to constitute a ‘Third Way’
between the deregulatory approach pursued since the late 1970s and a return to the
interventionist welfare state (Baldwin, Cave & Lodge 2010:7; Giddens 2000:27). The Third Way
emphasized market-based regulatory strategies (Yeung 2010:66; Better Regulation Task Force
2003) that employ market mechanisms, such as competition to pursue public policy goals. It also
emphasized management-based regulation, a reflexive approach which aims at stimulating selfcritical reflection of regulated in light of broad public criteria and goals. Thus, management-based
regulation asks firms ‘to produce plans that comply with general criteria designed to promote
the targeted social goal’ (Coglianese & Lazer 2003). Regulatory criteria ‘specify elements that
each plan should have, such as the identification of hazards, risk mitigation actions, [and]
procedures for monitoring and correcting’ (ibid.:694). In some cases, government regulations
provide mechanisms to approve or ratify these plans (ibid.:694). Management systems
standards, of which ISO 20121 is an example, are often used by regulated firms to implement
management-based regulation. Indeed, their use is often encouraged and sometimes even
required by regulators.
Management-based regulation is particularly useful when there is heterogeneity among
the regulated entities and when the capacities of the regulator to monitor and asses output are
limited (ibid.:705). Management-based regulation has the advantage of pushing more
responsibility to the firm level, where the technical knowledge is usually located. By using private,
third-party expert certifiers and auditors to verify compliance, the burden on governmental
resources is reduced (ibid.:696).
TBGI Project Working Paper No. 24
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The London organizers were familiar with this regulatory strategy and saw benefits for
the complex regulatory context that emerges in the preparation of a large-scale event such as
the Olympics. In London, such an approach integrated well into existing administrative and
private management structures and ultimately ensured that the organizers reached their
sustainability targets (LOC 2012).
Both BS 8901 and ISO 20121 were drafted for all types of events, not just sports events.
Furthermore, ISO 20121 is intended to benefit a whole range of actors in the event management
sector, including ‘event organizers, event owners, the workforce, supply chain (such as caterers,
stand constructors, transport companies), participants and attendees’ (ISO 2012:4). The London
Olympics in 2012 were both the impetus for ISO 20121 and the first test of the new standard.
The standard has since been applied in a number of different contexts ranging from the 2013
Eurovision Song contest to the Danish Presidency of the EU Council (ISO 2013). COP15, the
Copenhagen UN Conference on Climate Change was certified to BS 8901; and Microsoft hosted
the first event in the US to be BS 8901 certified in 2009 (ibid.; Microsoft Green Blog).
cc) Rio, Agenda 2020 and Current Sustainability Requirements for Host Cities
Since London, sustainability management has become a requirement for the organization
of any future Olympic Games. The current Host City Operational Requirements stipulate that a
‘sustainability strategy, sustainability implementation plans, governance arrangements for
sustainability matters, sustainability management systems, sustainability reports and a Games
impact study must be implemented’ (Host City Contract, Operational Requirements 2015:168).
Rio de Janeiro had the sustainable management approach already well embedded, announcing
the development of the Rio 2016 Sustainability Management Plan in its candidature file (Rio
2009: 95). While London designed its management system in line with the London Sustainable
Development Framework, a framework which provides a vision for sustainability in the city and
objectives to guide decision making;11 and international environmental management systems
standards, namely the European Union’s Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS) and ISO
14001 (London 2004: 76), Rio referred to the Rio Environment Summit of 1992 as well as local
environmental traditions (ibid.). The Rio Candidature File referenced the ISO 14000 family of
environmental management system standards, the ISO 26000 social responsibility guidance
standard, the Global Reporting Initiative, the One Planet Living Approach, the United Nations
Human Development Index and the Sustainable Development Index for different purposes. For
instance, the ISO 14000 standards were referenced as a way to ensure green procurement (Rio,
2009:99 and 105) Not coincidentally, the initial proposal for creating the new ISO 20121 standard
was jointly submitted by BSI and the Brazilian National Body (ABNT) (ISO 2012: 10). However,
despite these stipulations, Rio’s sustainability legacy has been mixed, and it has fought an uphill
battle in meeting obligations (Rio 2009)).
dd) The Way Forward
The examples above, show a continuous development towards stronger sustainability
standards. As mentioned, it was not only during the preparations of the Games in Lillehammer
or London that changes, and improvements of the regulatory framework were made. This also
happened in other host cities. However, there are also examples of less successful Olympic
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Games. The 2014 Sochi Olympics were even more problematic regarding sustainability. In fact,
many considered them an environmental failure. Important NGOs ceased collaboration with the
Organizing Committee, because they believed it was failing to fulfill the requirements set out in
the host city contract (Duval; WWF).
Nonetheless, sustainability and sustainability management are now well-established
principles in the preparation and execution framework of Olympic Games. The Agenda 2020 very
prominently stresses the importance of sustainability throughout its provisions (Agenda 2020).
Recommendation 4 emphasises the need to ‘include sustainability in all aspects of the Olympic
Games’. Furthermore, the Agenda commits the IOC to ‘[d]evelop a sustainability strategy to
enable potential and actual Olympic Games organisers to integrate and implement sustainability
measures that encompass economic, social and environmental spheres in all stages of their
project’ and furthermore ‘[a]ssist newly elected Organising Committees to establish the best
possible governance for the integration of sustainability throughout the organisation’ (Agenda
2020:12).
The current bidding process for the 2024 Olympic Games contains extensive sustainability
requirements. The Operational Requirements, which will complement the Host City Contract by
providing detailed regulatory requirements on many aspects of the Games preparations, asks for
a number of sustainability aspects to be integrated into the Games Delivery Plan. These include
a general sustainability strategy, implementation plans, governance arrangements, a
sustainability management system, sustainability reporting and an impact study (IOC 2015: 167).
The London approach of introducing a sustainability management framework is thus now
fully integrated within the Olympic Games planning and execution procedures. In the last bidding
round, the two remaining candidate cities – Paris and Los Angeles – had detailed sections on
sustainability. Both relied on ISO 20121 for their sustainability management system (Paris
2017:88; Los Angeles 2017: 64). ISO 20121 has thus become the de facto standard governing
sustainability management in the context of the Olympic Games.

4. Innovation, Cyclical Regulation and Transnational Business
Governance Interactions
a) Local Level Innovation in Cyclical Regulation – A Case of TBGI?
This part argues that the Olympic case study shows that the local level can function as a
place of innovation in complex regulatory processes. Here one can distinguish between the local
level generally and global cities in particular.
The role of the local level generally in complex transnational governance processes has
been examined most notably in literature on subsidiarity in the EU and in federal systems. The
principle of subsidiarity serves various purposes, from avoiding centralization to accommodating
different local and national value systems (Craig 2012:72-73). It also includes an understanding
that the local (as well as national) level has unique abilities not enjoyed by higher level entities:
Local authorities are much closer to their constituencies; they understand the specific local
conditions and preferences, and thus they can govern in a more fitting and accepted manner.
Through being closest to residents, they provide a contact point for citizen concerns and
complaints. Often this takes place through traditional venues that constituencies are familiar
TBGI Project Working Paper No. 24
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with (e.g. town hall meetings) and are supported by established administrative structures. For
similar reasons, both federal and centralist governments employ the local level as implementers
of their regulation. This is often done by granting some degree of discretion that can even amount
to independent local rule making (e.g. municipal bylaws).
However, subsidiarity and well established administrative structures do not entirely
account for the innovative potential of local entities. Though there is acknowledgement that the
local level is in many cases better equipped to interpret and implement, or even amend rules,
innovative potential is not necessarily encouraged in traditional legislative frameworks. Thus,
when looking at local innovation, one must go beyond those roles to consider the transformation
that many major urban centres have undergone in recent decades—in short, the emergence of
the phenomenon of global cities. Once this is considered it comes as no surprise that local entities
are playing a much more prominent role in transnational processes. Bigger cities, often unite
business capacity, expertise and cutting-edge technologies in a small space. Local level officials,
more generally, have frequent interaction with local business, NGOs and citizens. Consequently,
they can, may it be Lillehammer and London, access a large pool of expertise and resources- a
pool that is at least not readily available to a more specialized transnational regulator such as the
IOC.
Given the potential for regulatory innovation at the local level, what is its relationship to
transnational regulation? How are regulatory innovations taken up at higher levels? In some
contexts, the interplay between different regulatory levels is well developed and even legally
framed (Sabel & Zeitlin 2012). However, often it is not. In the case at hand we observe a cyclical
process that is semi-structured. The IOC is the initial regulator, a rule maker in terms of the RIT
framework (Abbott, Levi-Faur & Sindal 2017a). Cities that want to stand a chance in the selection
process need to comply with parameters provided by the IOC during the bidding process.
However, because of the competitive nature of the selection process, cities engage in innovation
to achieve an advantage over their competitors. As such, they expand their role, set new
standards, and become a kind of ‘secondary regulator’ (Abbott, Levi-Faur & Snidal 2017a:19). In
contrast to the RIT framework from which this term is taken, host cities are intermediaries only
by enforcing rules on local suppliers. They are not intermediaries in relation to future host cities.
At this transnational scale, the IOC incorporates successful innovations into its own regulatory
framework and then makes them binding for future host cities. At this point former host cities
are out of the picture or play a marginal role.
In summary, host cities are both rule takers and rule innovators. They are innovators in
that they expand existing regulatory frameworks and they are rule takers when they comply with
the requirements that the IOC has set out for the bidding process. The practical dispersion of
regulatory competences forces both host cities and the IOC to cooperate with each other, yet
not in an ongoing but in a temporal manner. This temporality of the relationship leads to a cyclical
process with regards to the overall regulatory framework for environmental protection in the
sports context. The innovations of one host city are implemented into the requirements set out
for the next one and tailored to the specific context. The IOC monitors these efforts and adapts
its overall framework regularly. However, because of the specific and unique character of each
Olympics, there is a discrepancy between the goals of the IOC long term regulatory perspective
and the goals of the organizing committees in executing successful games (Chappelet & KüblerMabbott, 2008:93).
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b) Higher Social and Environmental Standards and Transferability of Local Regulatory
Innovations
We now turn to a short discussion on whether the cyclical phenomenon of local
innovation and transnational dissemination leads to higher social and environmental standards
within the sports sector and beyond. This is a complex question that requires research that is not
possible within the limited space of this chapter. However, we can observe a number of trends
revealed in the Olympics case that find application beyond the scope of the case study.
First, we shall look at the possibility of ratcheting up standards through local level
innovation. Here we can clearly see that over time the transnational standard became much
more comprehensive, new methods and principles were added, which often originated locally.
As such we can say that in the Olympics case, local level innovation did lead to an upward trend
regarding standards. Reasons for this were that the capacities at the IOC were limited, regarding
both environmental regulation and municipal governance. Especially initially, the IOC had little
in-house environmental expertise. Established local practices and venues to gather input were
welcomed as a way to expand the existing transnational framework. Since Lillehammer, the rules
for environmentally friendly and sustainable Games have been constantly expanding. Current
expectations for host cities are extensive and take up as much space in the candidature files as
security or transport (e.g. Paris 2017). This trend is consistent with the experimentalist literature.
Because of limited capacities at the central (supranational or federal) level, local actors are
involved, and their expertise is used to constantly improve regulation (Dorf & Sabel 1998; Sabel
& Zeitlin 2008; Sabel & Zeitlin 2012).
Regarding the effective implementation of these improved standards in future Games,
the picture is more mixed. Here, two specificities of the Olympics play an important role: First,
regional diversity – the Olympics are supposed to take place in different parts of the world, not
only in Western democracies with high environmental standards. Differences in local
circumstances mean that a model that led to a large success in one context had only average
results in others (such as Rio); and some host cities face a much steeper uphill battle in
successfully implementing all promises made in the bid (Woody 2016). Moreover, there were
clear outliers such as Sochi in 2014, where many environmental promises made in the bidding
process and enshrined in the host city contract were not kept (Duval; WWF). Second, once the
Games are allocated, a sunk cost dynamic sets in. As time passes, it becomes almost impossible
to reallocate the Games, thus taking away the strongest leverage tool from the IOC. Thus, in cases
where the host cities are lacking behind in implementing their environmental obligations it is not
always possible to correct these dynamics.
As a result, the case study points to the limitations of local level innovation. When
implemented in different contexts, regulatory innovations must be adapted and altered to fit
changed circumstances. Thus, for any innovation it is important to assess its transferability to and
to understand in how far it can work in different circumstances.

c) The Role of Weaker Actors in Cyclical Regulation
The second central issue concerns the role of weaker actors in innovative local processes.
Again, given the focus on one specific case, this chapter cannot provide rules for local rules more
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generally. Yet it can point to several lessons learned from the present example that might be
transferable to other contexts as well. In the case at hand three aspects are of importance. First,
as stated above, the special context of the Olympics provides weaker actors a platform and a
point of entrance. These sports mega events receive significant public attention and in return are
under severe public scrutiny. NGOs and other civil society groups have for a long time used such
events as venues to draw public attention to local or global (environmental) issues. Some of these
issues were host country-related, rather than directly linked to the event itself (e.g. Free Tibet
protests in the context of the 2012 Olympics). However, it was through the interplay of the local
level with the global that the push for innovation could happen. For the London Olympics, for
instance, it was considered necessary that the planning be meticulous to avoid negative press
coverage that might delegitimize the event. This was to be achieved through strong procedures
and comprehensive involvement by a variety of concerned actors, such as the Bioregional and
the WWF regarding the sustainability strategy.
Secondly, established paths for certain groups representing weaker actors exist at in some
host cities, for example in Lillehammer and London. As mentioned Lillehammer had a strong local
environmental grassroots movement, which the organizers involved in the planning and
execution of the event. London too built its framework on a concept developed by a local NGO
(BioRegional). At the time, BioRegional had already established a record of creating and
promoting sustainable business and in that context, it had also cooperated with local authorities
for some time (Riddlestone 2014). It was therefore easier for BioRegional to get involved in the
preparation of the 2012 Olympics and to develop the sustainability strategy. Both points show
that the local level can function as an entrance point especially for smaller more local advocacy
groups representing weaker actors and concerns for public goods. Such involvement is even
easier if there is increased scrutiny on local authorities; and it also is easier for actors with already
established connections to local authorities.
A number of problems must not be overlooked. First, there is a limited pool of local actors
that can gather the necessary expertise to be regulatory innovators in the context of megaevents. In the Olympic case, only host cities with established environmental regulation
frameworks could trigger an expansion of the transnational framework. Other host cities
struggled to comply with existing rules. Consequently, local level innovative activities are often
limited to economically advanced communities of the West. These innovations are then
transferred to other contexts, where they may not work in the same manner. The IOC tries to
bridge this gap through its own initiatives, such as hosts’ workshops, the Olympic Games
Observer Programme, and the Coordination Commission, and by bringing on board third parties
such as UNEP or the WWF (see section 2 a). As was pointed out above, the success of these
measures is mixed (for the case of Sochi, see: WWF). Local circumstances do not always allow for
broad participation. In more authoritarian jurisdictions, exclusion rather than inclusion might be
the chosen path. Finally, not all processes are necessarily inclusive and even those that are
inclusive favour some actors over others. In the preparation of the sustainability management
system for the London Games, at least on the level of policy creation, actors with closer ties to
the business sector (BSI, but also BioRegional) were involved in a much higher degree.

TBGI Project Working Paper No. 24

Page 12

Schmidt

Local Practices, Transnational Solutions?

(2018)

5. Conclusion
This chapter pursued two goals. First, it identified the role local actors play in
transnational regulatory interactions. In contrast to more structured interactions such as the
ones described in the experimentalist governance literature, the role of local actors in the case
at hand is much broader, unpredictable, and often more innovative. This then led to a thorough
examination of the type of regulatory interaction engaged. Focus was put on the cyclical ways in
which innovation takes place. Here, again the current example provided a different story from
those found in related literature, particularly on orchestration and regulatory intermediaries. In
the RIT model, actors (rule-makers, intermediaries and rule-takers) have fairly determined roles.
In the example at hand, however, the actors involved change their role frequently, leading to
dynamic and to a degree anarchic processes that are less predictable from the outset.
Secondly, the chapter, in line with the general goal of this volume, examined whether the
described interactions led to higher social and environmental standards and the empowerment
of weaker actors. Here it found that local innovation ratcheted-up sustainability standards in the
sports sector. However, given the less predictable frame in which the interactions took place,
local level dynamics sometimes also had the opposite effects and not even existing standards
were met. Finally, participation of weaker actors was ensured through specific local-transnational
dynamics. Yet, the chapter also cautioned to generalize these dynamics as the Olympics provide
a very specific setting involving public attention that is unsurpassed outside the sporting context.
1

One highly topical example is ‘smart city regulation’. There are currently several initiatives within ISO to
standardize this development. Though strongly industry driven, local practices serve as a starting point for those
standards (ISO 2015).
2
The complexity is examined elsewhere, using the same case study (Schmidt). In this chapter the local level
constitutes one component among many others, such as the state level, the transnational sport regulator and
transnational business standard setting bodies.
3 See for instance ISO/IEC JTC1 Information Technology, Smart Cities, Preliminary Report 2014, available at:
https://www.iso.org/files/live/sites/isoorg/files/developing_standards/docs/en/smart_cities_report-jtc1.pdf.
4
All numbers stem from the 2012 London Summer Olympics, see IOC, Marketing Media Guide, London 2012, at 6
and 11, available at:
http://www.olympic.org/Documents/IOC_Marketing/London_2012/IOC_Marketing_Media_Guide_2012.pdf
5
Rule 37 Olympic Charter; Bye-Law to Rule 37.
6
Rule 33 Olympic Charter, By-Law to Rule 33.
7
IOC, Host City Election for the Olympic Winter Games 2022, available at: https://www.olympic.org/2022-hostcity-election.
8
IOC, Election of the 2018 Host City, available at: https://www.olympic.org/2018-host-city-election
9
IOC
Olympic Games Candidature Process. Available at: https://www.olympic.org/all-about-the-candidatureprocess.
10
Host City Contract Operational Requirements, p 9, available at:
http://www.olympic.org/Documents/Host_city_elections/Host_City_Contract_Operational_Requirements_Septem
ber_2015.pdf.
11
Mayor of London & London Sustainability Commission, A Sustainable Development Framework for London,
available at:
https://www.london.gov.uk/moderngov/Data/Environment%20Committee/20040318/Agenda/4%20Framework%
20PDF.pdf.
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